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ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2006). The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, Judge, Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah submitted an order overruling appellant's
objection to Commissioner Michael S. Evan's issuance of a protective order on October
30, 2006. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 etseq. (2006).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the district court properly ruled that the appellant, Rocky
Corwell ("Corwell"), was a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act") when he
was a former spouse of the appellee Stacey Hall ("Hall").
Issue 2: Whether Corwell waived any right to a hearing under the Cohabitant
Abuse Act when he filed his Notice to Submit for Decision notifying the district court
that the case was ready for a final resolution.
Standard of Review: The district court based its jurisdiction over Corwell on a
legal finding that Corwell was a "cohabitant" under the Act. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 306-l(2)(a) (2006) and (R. at 148). Corwell's right to a hearing under the Act also involves
a question of law.

This Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions for

correctness. Keene v. Bonser, 107 P.3d 693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.

(2)
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30-6-l(2)-(3) COHABITANT ABUSE ACT - DEFINITIONS:

"Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to
Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or older
who:

1

(a)

is or was a spouse of the other party;

(b)

is or was living as if a spouse of the other party;

(c)

is related by blood or marriage to the other party;

(d)

has one or more children in common with the other
party;

(e)

is the biological parent of the other party's unborn
child; or

(f)

resides or has resided in the same residence as the
other party.

(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include:
(a)

the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or
step-parent to a minor; or

(b)

the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or
foster siblings who are under 18 years of age.

UTAH CODE ANN. 30-6-l(2)-(3) COHABITANT ABUSE A C T
ABUSE—PROTECTIVE ORDERS:

- ABUSE OR DANGER OF

(1)

Any cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or domestic
violence, or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of abuse
or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective order or
a protective order in accordance with this chapter, whether or
not that person has left the residence or the premises in an
effort to avoid further abuse.

(2)

A petition for a protective order may be filed under this
chapter regardless of whether an action for divorce between
the parties is pending.

(3)

A petition seeking a protective order may not be withdrawn
without approval of the court.

UTAH CODE ANN, 30-6-4,3(1)(E) COHABITANT ABUSE A C T - HEARINGS ON EX PARTE
ORDERS:

(1)
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When a court issues an ex parte protective order the court
shall set a date for a hearing on the petition within 20 days
after the ex parte order is issued.
2

(e)

If the hearing on the petition is heard by a
commissioner, either the petitioner or respondent may
file an objection within ten days of the entry of the
recommended order and the assigned judge shall hold
a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection.

UTAH R. CIV. PROC. R. 7(D):

(d)

Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete,
either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision.'1 The
request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if
any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party
files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(b)(1), for purposes of this
appeal, Appellee agrees with the statement of the case and facts found on pages 4-6 of the
Brief of the Appellant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the district court properly upheld the Commissioner's issuance of the
protective order against Corwell under the Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act"). Corwell is a
cohabitant under the Act because he is Hall's former spouse. The annulment of the
parties' marriage does not preclude Corwell from being classified as a cohabitant. In
addition, the fact that the parties never resided together does not have any bearing on the
district court finding jurisdiction over Corwell under the Act.
Second, Corwell waived his right to a hearing under the Act when he filed his
Notice to Submit for Decision ("Notice"). The Notice stated that the case was ready for
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resolution by the court. In the alternative, the district court's failure to hold a hearing is
not reversible error.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING
THAT CORWELL, AS HALL'S FORMER SPOUSE, WAS A
COHABITANT UNDER THE COHABITANT ABUSE ACT EVEN
THOUGH CORWELL NEVER RESIDED WITH HALL.
Corwell is a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act") and the district

court properly overruled Corwell's objection to the Commissioner's issuance of the
protective order against him.

The Act provides protection to victims of domestic

violence. Victims can only obtain a protective order under the Act if their alleged
aggressor is a "cohabitant" for purposes of the Act.
Corwell contends that he is not a cohabitant because, by virtue of the annulment,
he was never Hall's spouse and because he never resided with Hall. The following
sections will show that 1) Corwell is a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act
because he was Hall's spouse; and 2) Corwell is a cohabitant even though he never
resided with Hall.
A.

Corwell is a cohabitant under the Cohabitant Abuse Act because he
was Hall's spouse.

The district court properly upheld the issuance of a protective order against
Corwell under the Act because he was Hall's spouse. The Act does not leave the
meaning of "cohabitant" open for interpretation. Rather, it clearly outlines several ways
in which an individual might attain "cohabitant" status. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(2)
(2006). The most relevant section for purposes of this appeal is section (2)(a), which

970956.3

4

states that a "'cohabitant' means ... a person who... is or was a spouse of the party."
(emphasis added). The Act is broad in its cohabitant definition to provide remedies for
previously unprotected victims. Bailey v. Bayles, 18 P.3d 1129, 1132 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App.
2001) ("The purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was to create a timely and simplified
process whereby some level of protection and safety could be afforded to victims who
had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available to persons involved in
criminal prosecutions.").
In interpreting the Act and its definition of "cohabitant," this Court "look[s] first to
the plain language of the statute to discern legislative intent." Keene v. Bonser, 107 P.3d
693, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). "In construing the plain language of a
statute, words 'which are used in used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in
the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for
laymen in such daily usage.'" Id.
The plain language of section (2)(a) defining cohabitation clearly applies to
spouses or former spouses. There is no ambiguity in this definition and no need to look
beyond the plain language of the statute. Therefore, applying the statute, Corwell is a
cohabitant because he is Hall's former spouse. It is undisputed that Corwell and Hall
were married on March 19, 2005 in Clark County, Nevada. (R. at 29).
Corwell contends that section (2)(a) should not apply to him because his marriage
to Hall was annulled and declared void ab initio on March 29, 2006. Brief of Appellant,
p. 6. However, the Act does not include such an exception in the case of annulment. In
fact, while the Utah legislature contemplated and created specific exceptions to the
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cohabitant definition for parent-child relationships and siblings under the age of eighteen,
it notably did not create an exception for annulled parties. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6(3) (2006).
Corwell argues that if this Court applies the Act to annulled parties then it is
abrogating the common law of annulment. He argues that the common law of annulment
can only be abrogated through a specific directive from the legislature.

However,

treating annulled parties as former spouses and cohabitants under the Act does not undo
the common law benefits of annulment for the involved parties.

For example, the

annulment still relieves parties from financial obligations such as alimony or other forms
of marital support.
Corwell also argued below at the district court level that the annulment precluded
him from being classified as a cohabitant under the Act. The district court correctly
rejected this proposition and stated in its order:
The clear purpose of the Protective Order statute is to provide
relief for persons who are the victims of violence in intimate
relationships. The clear intention of the legislature is that
those purposes be applied broadly. Those purposes are not
served by reliance on the legal fiction that the parties were
never married due to the annulment. The fact that they once
had the status of a married couple is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction under this act.
(R. at 148-9).
Like the district court, this Court also rejected a narrow interpretation of the Act's
cohabitant definition in Keene v. Bonser. There, Bonser contested the district court's
finding "that he "resided in the same residence" as Keene and was thus a "cohabitant"
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under the Act." Keene, 107 P.3d at 695. Despite living in Wyoming, Bonser frequently
stayed at Keene's Utah residence. Id. Bonser argued, inter alia, that he could not be a
cohabitant under the Act's residency prong, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-l(2)(f) (2006),
because he could not get a Utah's driver's license and because he could not register to
vote in Utah. Id. at 696. In other words, Bonser argued that the Court should narrow the
Act's cohabitant definition. The Court in Keene, however, rejected Bonser's proposal for
a "narrow, legalistic interpretation" of the Act's cohabitant definition. Id. In doing so, it
noted that the "Utah legislature has adopted a broader view of cohabitation in the
cohabitant abuse context than Utah case law has in other contexts." Id. (e mphasis
added).
Akin to Bonser's argument in Keene, Corwell is relying on the legal fiction of
annulment to argue that he should not be considered a cohabitant. Like in Keene, this
Court should reject Corwell's proposal for a narrow and legalistic interpretation of the
Act's cohabitant definition.
In addition to the plain language of the statute, public policy dictates that the Act
should extend protection to spouses who are victims of domestic violence even where
there has been an annulment. The Keene Court looked beyond the statutory definitions
and considered "the purpose behind the Act." Id. at 698. It noted the "expansive reach
intended by legislatures in enacting domestic violence and abuse statutes." Id. Likewise,
the district court recognized the purpose of the Act to protect "victims of violence in
intimate relationships." (R. at 148). Additionally, these purposes are evident in the Act
itself if one looks to the types of relationships the Act targets for protection from
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domestic abuse. For example, other than spouses or former spouses, the Act protects
those who reside together, have children together, or are related by blood or marriage.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-l(2)(c), (d) & (f) (2006).
Corwell and Hall were involved in an intimate relationship as evidenced by their
March 2005 marriage. This is precisely the type of involved emotional relationship the
Act is intended to encompass. The annulment did not reduce the emotional entanglement
of the parties. In fact, in many cases, annulment can, like divorce, escalate the parties'
emotions of hatred and animosity towards one another. As evidenced in this very case,
the parties continued to have problems even after the annulment. For instance, it is
undisputed that on one occasion Corwell called Hall and threatened to "punch her in the
face." Brief of Appellant p. 5. In sum, the Act is meant to protect victims who are
involved in complex emotional relationships from future violence.

The parties'

annulment did not diminish the complexity of their relationship. Thus, the Act should
continue to provide protection to victims, like Hall, even after a marriage is annulled.
To conclude, the district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell under the
Act because he is Hall's former spouse. This Court should reject Corwell's argument
that the annulment precludes him from being a cohabitant. The Act is not meant to be
applied in such a narrow and legalistic manner. Finally, public policy dictates extending
the Act to former spouses even where the spouses have annulled the marriage.
B.

Corwell is a cohabitant even though he never resided with Hall.

The district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell as a cohabitant under
the Act even though he never resided with Hall. A person who "resides or has resided in
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the same residence as the other party" is a cohabitant for purposes of the Act. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-l(2)(f) (2006). However, presenting evidence of joint residency is not
the only way to establish cohabitant status under the Act. For instance, a person is a
cohabitant if they are or were a spouse of the other party, if they are related by blood or
marriage to the other party, if they have common children with the other party, or if they
are the biological parent of the other party's unborn child. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6l(2)(a), (c)-(e) (2006). None of these relationships require the parties to have resided
together at any time. For example, it is quite common for those who are related by blood
not to reside together.

Also, many people who share common children have never

resided together. Thus, it is clear from the Act's cohabitant definition that there is no
separate requirement for residency.
Despite the unambiguous language of the statute, Corwell repeatedly argues that
the Act's cohabitant definition requires some form of residency. For example, he argues
that "[t]he primary characteristic of all the relationships encompassed by the Act is that
they require the parties to have resided together at some point." Brief of Appellant, p. 7.
He also argues that "[s]ince the parties ... never resided together as required by the Act,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue an ex parte protective order against appellant."
Id. at p. 10 (emphasis added). These arguments ignore the plain language of the statute.
Nowhere does the Act require residency.

As mentioned, there are several ways to

establish cohabitant status without having to show residency.
While some states require proof of residency to obtain jurisdiction over an alleged
aggressor, Utah's Act encompasses a larger range of relationships and thus does not
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require a showing of residency. For example, in Vermont's domestic abuse statute,
courts can only obtain jurisdiction over "persons living together or sharing occupancy
and persons who have lived together in a sexual relationship." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1101(2) (2006). Similarly, Ohio's domestic abuse statute limits its jurisdictional reach
to a "person who is residing or has resided with the offender . . . ." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2919.25(F)(1)(a) (2007). Vermont and Ohio are among several states that require
some form of residency to obtain jurisdiction in domestic abuse cases. Had the Utah
legislature intended to require residency as Corwell contends, it would have stated so
explicitly as other states have done.
To conclude, contrary to Corwell's arguments, the Act does not include a
residency requirement in its cohabitant definition. There are several other ways for a
party to meet the Act's jurisdictional requirement without ever showing residency. Here,
the district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell because the parties were
spouses. The fact that the parties never resided together does not bear any weight on this
Court's review of the district court's jurisdictional finding.
II.

CORWELL WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO A HEARING WHEN HE FILED
HIS NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION.
Corwell effectively waived any right to a hearing when he filed his Notice to

Submit for Decision with the district court on October 24, 2006. Corwell filed an
objection (R. at 89) to the issuance of the protective order against him on June 2, 2006,
along with a supporting memorandum (R. at 91-96). Once the objection has been filed,
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the district court is to hold a hearing within twenty days of the filing of the objection. See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-6-4.3(l)(e) (2006).

Approximately five months later, on October 24, 2006, Corwell filed the pleading
titled 'Notice to Submit for Decision' ("Notice"). (R. at 146). In the Notice, Corwell
stated that his motion objecting to the issuance of the protective order was "at issue and
ready for decision of the Court."

Under the circumstances, Corwell should not be

allowed to raise the objection of a lack of hearing now on appeal. The district court
should have been "given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate,
correct it." See State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). By submitting
the Notice and representing that the case was ready for decision, Corwell waived the right
to a hearing.
Moreover, the district court's failure to hold a hearing is not reversible error.
Corwell raised two arguments in his objection memorandum: 1) the district court lacked
jurisdiction because Corwell was not a cohabitant; and 2) the finding that Corwell
presented a credible threat should be overturned because misrepresentations made by
Hall in the Petition required a finding that Hall was not credible and should not be
awarded a protective order. (R. at 91-96). As to this second argument, Corwell did not
request an opportunity to present new evidence, but rather challenged the finding of a
threat based on the record evidence received by the Commissioner during the protective
order hearing (which was not an ex parte hearing). (R. 91-96).
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The first argument is purely a legal argument which the district court could resolve
without an evidentiary hearing. It required the district court only to look at the Act's
definition of cohabitant and determine whether Corwell qualified as a cohabitant.
With respect to Corwell's second argument, Corwell has not challenged on appeal
the factual finding that he presented a threat to Hall, and characterizes his argument as a
purely legal argument. Appellant's Brief, p. 1. By failing to challenge specific factual
findings, Corwell has waived this issue. Moreover, Corwell's attack on the threat finding
was based on the record submitted to the Commissioner. As noted above, Corwell did
not ask for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. In addition, there are undisputed facts
which support the finding that Corwell presented a threat to Hall's safety. Namely,
Corwell called and threatened Hall that he would "punch her in the face." Brief of
Appellant, p. 5. Under the circumstances, remand for a hearing is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly found jurisdiction over Corwell under the Cohabitant
Abuse Act. Also, Corwell waived his right to a hearing under the Act by filing a Notice
to Submit for Decision indicating to the district court that the case was ready for a final
resolution. This Court should affirm the judgment of the district court and uphold the
protective order issued against Corwell.

MICHAEL Z O M /
PARSONS BEHL£ & LATIMER
Attorneys for Stacey Hall
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2007, I caused to be mailed, first class,
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to:
JOANNA B.SAGERS
KERI GARDNER
Attorneys for Appellee/Petitioner
Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake
205 North 400 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
RANDY S. LUDLOW
Attorney for Appellant/Respondent
185 South State Street, Suite 208
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ADDENDUM A
See attached Appellant's Notice to Submit for Decision and Memorandum in Support of
Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Issuance of Ex Parte Protective Order.
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Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-1300
Fax: (801)328-0173
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STACY C. HALL
Petitioner,

)
)

vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT'S
OBJECTION TO
COMMISSIONER'S ISSUANCE
OF EX PARTE
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Civil No. 064902056 CA

ROCKY CORWELL,
Respondent.

Judge Quinn
Comm. Michael S. Evans

COMES NOW the respondent, Rocky Corwell, by and through his attorney of
record, Randy S. Ludlow, who hereby files his objection, as provided in § 30-6-4.3(l)(e),
Utah Code Ann., (2006), to the issuance of an ex parte protective order against him by
Commissioner Evans, on the following grounds:
I.
THE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER WERE NEVER COHABITANTS AS
DEFINED IN § 30-6-1, UTAH CODE ANN. (2006), THEREFORE THIS COURT
LACKS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN EX PARTE PROTECTIVE ORDER
AGAINST RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO THE COHABITANT ABUSE ACT.
Petitioner and respondent are not cohabitants as defined in § 30-6-1 of the
Cohabitant Abuse Act (the "Act"), therefore this court lacks jurisdiction under to the Act
to issue an ex parte protective order against respondent. The Act defines several classes
of persons as "cohabitants." The two relevant classes in this matter are found at § 30-6-

l(2)(a), which requires that the parties are or were spouses/and^J 30-6-l(2)(f), which
requires that the parties reside or resided in the same residence. In this case, the parties
never resided in the same residence, and the parties' brief marriage was annulled and
declared void ab initio in March, 2006, prior to the events alleged in petitioner's Verified
Petition for Protective Order.
Petitioner indicates in her Verified Petition that the parties did not reside together
at any time. This is consistent with the sworn stipulation entered into by the parties in the
annulment action, which is attached as Exhibit A to this Memorandum, wherein the
petitioner agreed that she and the respondent never resided together at any time. Exhibit
A, Stipulation, dated March 3, 2006, \ 4.
Commissioner Evans relied on § 30-6-l(2)(a), which requires that the parties are
or were spouses. However, the annulment void ab initio had the effect of legally
rendering the marriage null and void. Utah has generally adopted the common law
regarding annulments, as evidenced in § 30-1-17.1(2), Utah Code Ann. (2006). Under
the common law and as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, an annulment "differs
conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a legal status, whereas an
annulment establishes that a marital status never existed." Abridged Fifth Edition (1983).
Under Utah case law, the only area where annulment is treated differently than at
common law involves the reinstatement of alimony from a prior marriage following
annulment of the subsequent marriage. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 P.2d 1380 (Utah
1977). In Ferguson, the Utah Supreme Court relied on principles of equity and public
policy to find an exception to the common law regarding annulment. The Court looked
to language in Title 30 of the Utah Code that authorized the district court to award
alimony and support in annulment actions as equity required. To the Court, this
2

evidenced the Legislature's intent to ensure that woman and children were not left
without any support following an annulment. Id. at 1382. The Court observed that the
principal argument for restoring alimony from the prior marriage was that alimony was
not allowed in annulments and if the woman's prior status was not restored, she would be
left without support. Id. at 1381. Since the Legislature had provided for alimony in
annulments, the Court reasoned that it could not mechanically reinstate alimony but had
to make a determination whether such reinstatement was equitable. The Legislature has
since clarified the statute to make clear that alimony will be reinstated following an
annulment void ab initio so long as the prior spouse is made a party to the annulment
action and his rights are determined therein. § 30-3-5(9), Utah Code Ann. (2006).
Under the rules of statutory construction, the court must "construe each act of the
legislature so as to give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it
into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in harmony
and avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991). Under §
30-1-17.1, the Legislature makes clear its intent not to abrogate the common law
regarding annulment. When the Legislature has intended to alter the common law, it has
done so specifically, as in § 30-3-5(9).
The Cohabitant Abuse Act does not specify any exceptions to the common law of
annulment. It states that cohabitants includes parties who were spouses,, Under the
common law of annulment, the parties to the marriage were never spouses because the
marriage is considered null at its inception. If the Act is read to incorporate an unstated
abrogation of the common law, it directly contradicts the Legislature's intent to rely on
the common law except for certain limited exceptions.

In order to harmonize the various provisions referred to above, it is necessary to
follow the previous example set by the Legislature and assume that if the Legislature had
intended to abrogate the common law and treat annulments in the same manner as
divorces, it would have stated so within the Act.
It is likely that the Legislature did not do so, because it was assumed that if the,
marriage was annulled the parties would still be encompassed within the Act because
they had resided together. The overall intent of the Act is to provide persons with a legal
means to protect themselves from violence perpetrated bv the persons with whom they
reside. The case at hand is unique, however, in that the parties never in fact resided
together, despite attempting to enter into a marriage. The parties had a wedding but
because of the petitioner's admitted misrepresentations to induce the respondent to marry
her, they never in fact had a marriage, which the court recognized in granting the
annulment void ab initio. Since the parties were never legally spouses and because they
never resided together as required by the Act, this court lacks jurisdiction to issue an ex
parte protective order against respondent. Therefore, the ex parte protective order issued
by Commissioner Evans must be dismissed.
II.
RESPONDENT DOES PRESENT A CREDIBLE THREAT TO PETITIONER'S
SAFETY THEREFORE THE PROTECTIVE ORDER SHOULD BE DENIED
Under § 30-6-2, Utah Code Ann. (2006), the petitioner must show previous
domestic abuse or the substantial likelihood of imminent abuse in order for the court to
issue a protective order. In the ex parte protective order, Commissioner Evans found that
the respondent "presents a credible threat to the physical safety" of petitioner. However,
petitioner makes several material misrepresentations within her verified petition, which
seriously impact her credibility.

In her sworn Verified Petition, petitioner states in Paragraph 3 that she and
respondent are currently married, when in fact the marriage was annulled one month
earlier. In Paragraph 5, petitioner states that she initiated the annulment action (Third
District Court case number 054902113) and that respondent was "violently opposed" to
this action. However, the respondent was in fact the petitioner in that action. A copy of
the Decree of Annulment is attached as Exhibit B to this Memorandum. Finally,
petitioner states her name within the Verified Petition as "Stacey Corwell." Pursuant to
the Decree of Annulment, however, petitioner was awarded her maiden name "Stacy
Hall."
Whether petitioner deliberately misled the court or whether she is merely
confused or in denial regarding her marital status and the procedural history of the
annulment, these misrepresentations cast serious doubt upon the entire verified petition
and upon petitioner's version of what occurred in April 2006 and her allegations
regarding earlier abuse.
In addition to petitioner's misrepresentations, respondent presented evidence to
Commissioner Evans indicating that petitioner had been subjecting respondent and his
girlfriend to ongoing threats and harassment, that respondent requested assistance from
the Salt Lake City police department to stop petitioner's ongoing harassment prior to his
alleged threat against petitioner, and that respondent was recovering from the effects of
anesthesia and recuperating from eye surgery at the time the alleged threat was made.
Exhibit C, Response in re Protective Order.
When these circumstances are viewed in their entirety, in light of petitioner's
false statements in the Verified Petition, it is not substantially likely that respondent
ronstitutes a credible imminent threat to petitioner. Petitioner has abused this process in
5

her ongoing efforts to harass the respondent. Prior abuse or a substantial likelihood of
imminent abuse by respondent does not exist in this case and the court should deny
petitioner's request for a protective order.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner and respondent are not cohabitants as defined by the Cohabitant Abuse
Act, therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to issue a protective order against respondent
and the petitioner's request must be denied. In the alternative, based on the overall
circumstances and material falsehoods made by petitioner in her Verified Petition for
Protective Order, a substantial likelihood does not exist that respondent presents an
imminent credible threat to petitioner's safety, and respondent asks the court to deny
petitioner's request for a protective order.
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